This paper examines the effects of losses in U.S. state pension funds on state borrowing costs. Since public-employee pension obligations are generally senior to state general obligation bonds, increases in unfunded pension liabilities are a serious concern for municipal bond investors. During the 3 months ending December 2008, losses in state pension funds amounted to between 1% and 6% of annual gross state product, and between 9% and 48% of annual state revenue, depending on the state. Using this cross-sectional variation, we find that over this period tax-adjusted municipal bond spreads rose by 10-20 basis points for each 1% of annual gross state product lost in pension funds by states in the lower half of the credit quality spectrum. A similar result holds for each 10% of annual state revenues lost. The effect is approximately constant over the yield curve, suggesting a constant upward shift in annual risk-neutral default probabilities. These results are robust to controls for credit ratings and other measures of the state's fiscal strength. They hold within credit rating categories and are strongest among states with the weakest ratings. We conclude that U.S. state borrowing costs will likely increase if unfunded state liabilities continue to grow, making state debt more expensive to finance.
to the pensions of public employees, these liabilities are generally at least as senior as state general obligation bonds (Brown and Wilcox (2009) ). As a result, each dollar lost in an underfunded state pension fund represents an additional dollar of senior unsecured debt above the state's (effectively junior) general obligation debt.
We find that for each 1% of annual gross state product lost in pension funds during this period, tax-adjusted municipal bond spreads were higher by approximately 10 basis points for states rated AA, and by approximately 20 basis points for states rated AA-and below. Analogous results hold when the losses are scaled by state revenue. For each 10% of revenue lost, spreads rose by approximately 10 basis points for states rated AA, and by approximately 20 basis points for states rated AA-and below. States rated AA, AA-, or below constitute approximately half of our sample. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find no effect of the losses in the states in the half of our sample that have ratings better than AA.
The amount of money lost in state public-employee pension funds during this quarter was substantial relative to the amount of state municipal debt outstanding. In the last quarter of 2008 alone, we estimate that assets in pension funds sponsored by U.S. states fell in value by approximately $400 billion. This amount is approximately 42% of the $940 billion in total outstanding state municipal bond debt (i.e. their on-balance-sheet debt). As a result, during this 3-month period, state municipal bond investors as a group effectively faced the appearance in the state's debt structure of a new, senior, offbalance-sheet debt equal to 42% of their existing positions. Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009a) calculate that as of December 2008, total unfunded pension liabilities under proper accounting were 3.5 times larger than state municipal debt on the balance sheet. As reviewed in Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009b) , these pension promises were already deeply underfunded even before the financial crisis.
Importantly, there was substantial cross-sectional variation in the development of the underfunding of pension liabilities across states during the last quarter of 2008. For example, Tennessee lost the smallest percentage of gross state product (GSP) at 1.4%, and West Virginia lost the smallest percentage of annual state non-investment revenue at 8.7%. In contrast, Arkansas lost 5.6% of GSP and Ohio lost 47.7% of annual state non-investment revenue. As a percentage of tax revenue (that is, excluding intergovernmental revenue and charges for state services), Ohio's loss was more than 100% -the state lost more in the investment fund in 2008Q4 than it had collected in tax revenue in all of 2007.
Merely observing that municipal bond spreads rose in aggregate during this period would not allow us to conclude that the increase in spreads, and hence state borrowing costs, was due to this effect. Many other events were happening simultaneously, including a flight to the quality and liquidity of Treasury bonds and a general deterioration of state and federal public finances. Comparing the change in spreads between the states that were not as affected by the pension fund losses and the states that were more affected allows us to eliminate these macroeconomic effects.
The state-level variation comes from three sources: 1.) differences in the size of the state employee pension funds relative to the state's economy or revenue base, 2.) differences in the extent to which those promises were funded as of September 2008, and 3.) differences in the asset allocation pursued by the state funds. States with larger total pension liabilities relative to their economies or revenue bases, states that have larger funding ratios for a given liability, and states that took greater risk with those assets were therefore more exposed. Importantly, our results are robust to controlling for credit ratings and for the size of state pension liabilities. The results are therefore not driven by the possibility that states that sponsor large public-employee pension plans suffered larger declines in creditworthiness during this period for other reasons (e.g., because the market viewed them as more fiscally profligate on other dimensions).
A further concern we address is the possibility that states that suffered large losses relative to their economies and revenue streams might also be the states for which revenue is the most cyclical.
This cyclicality might cause the municipal market to punish these states more in a recession. Standard risk management theory suggests this explanation is unlikely, as states with more pro-cyclical revenues should have been more cautious in their investment strategies. Regardless, the results are also robust to controlling for the historical sensitivity of state revenues to gross state product, measured over 1992-
2007.
Our analysis is based on pricing data from 15,727 municipal bonds, from which we calculate yields based on bond characteristics. Two important technical issues are the treatment of call features in the bonds and the treatment of the fact that the interest on the bonds is tax exempt. To address the fact that many bonds in our sample are callable, we option-adjust the yield spreads we employ in our regression, so that these reflect states' true fixed-rate borrowing costs over horizons equal to the bonds' durations, and not the costs of states maintaining refinancing rights. To address the tax issue, we gross up the yields based broadly on the findings of Poterba and Verdugo (2008) , with the result being that our main coefficients are higher by approximately the magnitude of (1/(1-τ)) than they would be if we ignored the tax subsidy provided by the government. The use of tax-adjusted yields means that our results reflect the total cost of state borrowing, including the subsidy provided by the U.S. government.
Our main dependent variable is the change in the spread of the tax-adjusted yield over Treasury bonds of comparable duration. We note that since we are examining changes, the results are very similar if we consider changes in yields instead of changes in yield spreads.
Our analysis also has implications for the effects of these state losses on the risk-neutral default probabilities and recovery rates implied in municipal bond prices. As illustrated by Duffie and Singleton (1999) , changes in bond spreads can be due to: 1.) changes in actual default probabilities; 2.) changes in the price of a contingent claim in the default state of the world (the "state prices"); or 3.) changes in the market's estimation of recovery rates if the borrower defaults. If recovery rates in default were unchanged, our yield spread results could be interpreted as revealing the increase in risk-neutral (or "subjective") default probabilities, which incorporates both active probabilities and state prices. For example, for each 1% of annual gross state product (or 10% of state revenues) lost during this period, the 10-20 basis point increase in the yield spread would be consistent with a 10-20 basis point increase in risk-neutral annual default probabilities assuming no recovery in default, or a 20-40 basis point increase in risk-neutral annual default probabilities assuming the market expected a 50 percent recovery rate in default.
Given that state revenues are pro-cyclical, our analysis also highlights the fact that by investing pension funds in equities, states experience increased borrowing costs under exactly those conditions when their tax base is decreasing, i.e., in recessions and at times when the stock market performs poorly. Analysis of optimal state pension fund investment policy starts from the premise that if citizens can (and do) undo the investment decisions made by states, then pension fund investment policy is not relevant for social welfare (see for example Lucas and Zeldes (2009) ). However, the correlation we find between poor asset performance and higher borrowing costs represents an additional reason why state public pension fund investment policy might have welfare implications.
The magnitude of losses during the event period we study is only modestly large. A loss of even 50% of a year's tax revenue is not likely to be catastrophic for a solvent state. However, the magnitude of the effect of these losses on yield spreads indicates that prices in the market for state municipal bonds do at least to some degree reflect default probabilities. U.S. state borrowing costs will likely increase if unfunded state liabilities continue to grow, making state debt more expensive to finance. We note that if an increased borrowing cost exactly matches the increase in the state's valuable option to default, then states might not care that they face higher borrowing rates. However, to the extent that the state bears costs of financial distress in the event of a default, the default option may well be more of a concern to markets than it is a value to the state. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 explains relevant institutions in the municipal bond market and state pensions, and it reviews relevant literature. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 explains how we calculate option-adjusted and tax-adjusted yields from bond pricing data; these yields reflect states' true fixed-rate borrowing costs and serve as our main dependent variables. Section 4 discusses the main results. Section 5 concludes.
Institutional Background and Literature Review
The main objective of this paper is to measure and interpret the change in municipal bond yields that results when state sponsors suffer large investment losses. As such, there are three areas where an explanation of existing literature and institutional details are required: the market for municipal (and sovereign) debt, state-sponsored pension funds, and the consequences of government fiscal imbalances.
A.) Municipal Bond Markets
Municipal bonds are bonds issued by sub-national government entities, including U.S. states.
Municipal bonds may be general obligation (GO) bonds, in which case the proceeds may be used for any purpose and the obligation is backed by the obligor's ability to levy taxes. Alternatively, they may be revenue bonds, in which case they are secured by revenues from a specific enterprise.
The primary distinction in the modern era between municipal bonds and sovereign bonds, which are issued by countries, is that issuers of municipal finance do not have the ability to control the circulation of the currency in which their debt is denominated. Sovereign entities can effectively repudiate debt denominated in local currency by allowing inflation; and since national governments also typically control statistical offices, there is even sometimes scope for manipulating indices that underlie inflation-indexed debt. States and municipalities, in contrast, do not have the capacity to "inflate away" their debts, although such debts do fall in value if inflation happens on a national scale.
The last state default to occur was Arkansas during the Great Depression in the 1930s (Litvack (1999) ). The most significant round of repudiation of state indebtedness happened following the extreme circumstances of the Civil War, in which at least 13 states defaulted (Spiotto (2008) ). While institutions such as credit rating agencies and municipal bond insurance have developed since these times for the purposes of protecting investors, occasional county and city-level defaults (such as Orange County, California in 1994) and the recent financial crisis have exposed the limits of the protections these institutions afford. As a result, some of the default considerations that have arisen in the literature on sovereign defaults may now be relevant for municipal bonds.
The literature on municipal bonds has focused on the impact of their tax treatment on their prices and yields. Interest on U.S. municipal bonds is exempt from federal taxation as long as the bonds meet certain legal requirements. Bonds that are not tax exempt include those for certain private activities, as well as those designed to take advantage of arbitrage profits by buying Treasuries. Finance theory going back to Miller (1977) has posited that after-tax yields from comparable taxable and taxexempt bonds should only differ by the tax rate of the marginal municipal bond investor. A large literature has attempted to measure the tax rate implicit in municipal bonds.
One fact that comes out of this literature is that the yields on long-term tax-exempt debt were historically quite high relative to the yields on long-term Treasury bonds, apparently higher than could be explained simply by the multiplicative effect of tax rates in the model of Miller (1977) . Trzcinka (1982) and other authors have ascribed this "municipal bond puzzle" to the idea that municipal default risk may be higher than that of U.S. Treasury bonds, even though close to half of municipal bonds are protected by monoline insurance (Nanda and Singh (2004) ). In contrast, Chalmers (1998) shows that the puzzle is still present among bonds which have been pre-refunded. When a bond is pre-refunded (or "advance refunded"), new securities are issued and the proceeds are invested in Treasuries and placed in an escrow account to defease the existing obligation.
1 Furthermore, many municipal bonds are callable by the issuer, and pre-refunding bonds to a certain maturity date (usually the first call date)
eliminates the uncertainty about when the principal will be repaid. Municipal bonds may differ from each other and from Treasuries in their liquidity, which is a leading hypothesis for the "muni puzzle".
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This literature highlights three important points for the purpose of our analysis. First, there may be substantial heterogeneity among municipal bonds in the degree to which their promises are secured by specific projects. As a result, we will limit our analysis to general obligation municipal bonds which are unsecured. Second, the fact that many municipal bonds are callable requires them to be viewed as a package of a straight bond and a short call option (held by the state). These considerations will affect the computations of yields and spreads for callable bonds. Third, prerefunded municipal bond spreads are very unlikely to reflect default risk. While the risk of legislative action that affects these investments could affect the prices of pre-refunded issues, default risk does not. Therefore, the difference in yields 1 Pre-refunding is thus a mechanism by which states can take advantage of falling borrowing costs or can effectively call bonds before their call dates. Tax law generally allows issuers to invest the proceeds at any yield that is as high as the municipal yield, though not higher (Wood (2008) ). Such a transaction was common when Treasury yields were above municipal yields -by using bonds of different maturities states could match the received muni yield with the Treasury bond yield and thus refinance before the call date. 2 There are many other attempts to derive implicit marginal tax rates in the muni market. Green (1993) explains the muni puzzle with a model in which investors optimally choose portfolios with offsetting investment interest expense, so that the taxable part of their bond portfolio is not taxable. Longstaff (2009) uses an affine termstructure approach to derive an average marginal tax rate for municipal investors of 41.6%. Ang, Bhansali, and Xing (2008) show that comparing trades in bonds with varying degrees of market discount can lead to implicit tax rates of close to 100%.
and performance between municipal bonds that are pre-refunded (ultimately about 16% of our sample) and those that are not may provide information about the possibility of municipal defaults.
An additional consideration is the existence of heterogeneity in the degree to which municipal bonds are insured. Anecdotally, market participants became wary of the value of this insurance during late 2008, due to increasing concerns about counterparty risk. We observe whether the bonds in our sample are insured or not, and we examine the extent to which the insurance protected bond value in the face of state investment losses.
B.) State Pension Funds
In a typical defined benefit (DB) pension plan, an employer pledges an annual pension payment that is a function of the employee's final salary and years of employment. Standards of Practice (ASOP) item 27 stipulate that public pension liabilities are to be discounted at the expected rate of return on pension assets. This procedure creates a major potential bias in the measurement of public pension liabilities. Discounting liabilities at an expected rate of return on the assets in the plan runs counter to the entire logic of financial economics: financial streams of payment should be discounted at a rate that reflects their risk (Modigliani and Miller (1958) ), and in particular their covariance with priced risks (Treynor (1961) , Sharpe (1964 ), Lintner (1965 ). In practice, state actuaries discount all cash flows promised under pension plans at a rate of 8%.
In a recent study, Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009a) found that while total state pension liabilities under state government reporting were $3.0 trillion at the end of 2008, using a correct discounting procedure reveals that they are dramatically larger. We considered two discount rate candidates for a given pension-related cash flow: 1.) the yield on a zero-coupon state GO municipal bond with the same term as the payment, grossed up to eliminate the tax preference given to borrowing; and 2.) a zerocoupon Treasury rate with the same term as the cash flow in question. The muni-based rate would be appropriate from the perspective of taxpayers who thought that the state could default on its pension obligations under the same circumstances as it would on its general obligations. While in some states this may be appropriate, most states contain constitutional guarantees that effectively place state pension obligations senior to general obligations in the state's debt structure (Brown and Wilcox (2009) ).
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The Treasury-based rate may be appropriate as a default-free rate. However, Treasury rates include an inflation-risk premium (Fisher (1975) , Barro (1976) ), which is generally positive, and likely additionally contain a liquidity discount (Duffie and Singleton (1997) , Longstaff (2004) , Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008)). The liquidity concerns would argue for using rates higher than Treasury bonds, while the inflation effects would argue for using lower rates, since state projections of payments almost always contain cost of living adjustments.
3 Brown and Wilcox (2009) conclude that states offering a constitutional guarantee make up a "clear majority". They highlight the 8 states with the most protections (Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, and New York, and New Mexico) and the 2 states with the rules offering the fewest protections (Indiana and Delaware). However, the true stance of many states in the middle may not yet have been tested through cases, so that variation in these protections does not represent a useful source of identifying variation for our tests. The results are in any case robust to the exclusion of Delaware, which carries a AAA rating. Indiana does not issue longterm general obligation municipal bonds.
Discounting using taxable municipal bond rates, which reflect states borrowing costs, yields total state liabilities of $3.3 trillion, and unfunded liabilities of $1.3 trillion (Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009a)).
Discounting using Treasury rates yields total state liabilities of $5.2 trillion, and unfunded liabilities of $3.2 trillion. A further reason to view these pension liabilities as very safe is that the figures are based solely on payments that have already been promised and accrued. In other words, even if the pension plans could be completely frozen, states would still contractually owe these benefits. A substantial fraction of liabilities are due to former state workers who are already retired.
Given the relative seniority of public-employee pension obligations, increases in unfunded pension liabilities are a serious concern for municipal bond investors.
C.) Fiscal Imbalances, Interest Rates, and Borrowing Costs
As mentioned previously, most literature on the effects of deficits on interest rates have focused on a macroeconomic channel by which government borrowing crowds out private investment. This study is examining a different channel by which deficits matter, namely that they raise government borrowing costs. Higher borrowing costs require more taxpayer money to be dedicated to servicing the debt, and they tie the hands of government if it needs to borrow further in times of crisis.
The literature examining the macroeconomic channel is large. Engen and Hubbard (2004) and Gale and Orszag (2004) provide reviews and recent evidence. One of the primary challenges is measuring innovations in government policy that are not foreseen by markets (Plosser (1982 (Plosser ( , 1987 ).
This paper also relates to a literature on state public finances and how they affect state borrowing costs. Again, the challenge is measurement of innovations in state government policy.
Poterba and Rueben (2001) find that unexpected state deficits were correlated with higher state bond yields during the 1990s, though this effect was smaller for states with tight balanced-budget rules.
Poterba ( 
Data and Summary Statistics
This section describes the data and presents summary statistics. We also show raw correlations between municipal bond returns and state investment losses.
A.) Data
For municipal bond data, we use two main sources. The first source is the S&P Municipal Bond CUSIP Master File. This file contains CUSIP identifiers, and the attributes file allows us to determine which bonds are issued by states as opposed to municipalities, as well as which bonds are general obligation and which bonds are revenue bonds. We retain only state-issued general obligation bonds that are unsecured and mature in 2008 or later. These bonds represent the grand majority of total value in the muni portion of the CUSIP master file.
From Bloomberg we download the rest of the bond attributes: whether the bond is insured and if so by which monocline insurer, the size of the issue, whether the bond is callable, call price, first call The final sample is 15,727 bonds that were outstanding during this entire time period. These bonds represent a total of $707 billion in value.
5 Figure 1 gives a general overview of the entire municipal bond market during this period. These graphs are based on Bloomberg aggregates and, unlike our sample, are not limited to state general obligation bonds. 6 The top graph shows yield spreads on September 30th for A-, A+, AA+, and AAA rated municipal bonds. Spreads at the short end of the curve ran from around 0.5 percentage points for AAA bonds to around 1 percentage point for A-bonds. Spreads were somewhat smaller at less than a 10-year horizon. At a 15-year horizon they are similar to the short-horizon spreads. At a 30-year horizon, spreads were around 0.9 percentage points for AAA bonds and 1.6 percentage points for A-bonds.
The middle graph shows the December 31st spreads, which requires a much broader scale on the vertical axis. While very short-horizon spreads remained about where they were on September 30th, the rest of the yield curve shifted dramatically upwards for all credit rating categories. The bottom graph shows this change in yield spreads. An important point illustrated by the bottom graph is that spreads on municipal bonds of all credit ratings increased substantially. Spreads in the 5-10 year range increased by about 1 percentage point, while spreads in the 10-30 year range increased by about 1. For pension liabilities, we use the database constructed from Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs) described in Rauh (2009a, 2009b) . In that study, we examined the most recent Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) for each pension plan and collected total actuarial liabilities for each pension plan, along with the discount rate used by state actuaries to calculate these liabilities. The data also contain our present value measures of already-promised state pension liabilities using discount rates that reflect their risk.
B.) Summary Statistics
Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics on the bonds and the state-level variables respectively. The median bond matures in 2017 and has a coupon of 5%. 32% of the bonds are insured, 16% were pre-refunded by the end of the sample period, and 61% were callable. The mean holdingperiod return on these bonds was 0.9%. The mean duration of the payments (ignoring call features) was 5.8 years.
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Section 3 explains in detail how we calculate yields and yield spreads from bond prices, taking the call features of the bonds into account. The mean yield spread for a bond in our sample was 0.6 percentage points on September 30, 2008, and rose to 1.7 percentage points on December 31, 2008.
We tax-adjust these yields based broadly on the findings of Poterba and Verdugo (2008) , by grossing up the yields by 25%. Poterba and Verdugo (2008) document that over the 10 years from 1998-2007 the spread of Treasuries over municipal bonds has been in the range of 50bp to 139bp, representing an implicit tax rate of between 14.9% and 30.0%. Over the period from 1991 to December 2008, the average implicit tax rate was 26.3%, and over 1997-2008 it was even lower. Their analysis assumes the market believed municipal bonds were no more likely to default than Treasuries, an assumption that is clearly violated today. During our sample period, Treasuries traded at a premium to AAA municipal bonds. Our assumption is therefore equivalent to the notion that during the Poterba and Verdugo (2008) period, the default probabilities for AAA municipals equaled the default probability for Treasuries, even though that is no longer the case today.
The effect of adjusting the yield spreads upwards by 25% for taxes is essentially to raise the coefficients by 1/(1-25%) or 4/3rds. Some authors conclude that the marginal investor in municipal bonds has much higher tax rates. In particular, Longstaff (2009) derives a rate of 41.6% based on an affine term-structure model, and Ang, Bansali and Xing (2008) find rates of 75% or even 100% based on the trades of market participants in market-discount bonds. To the extent that the marginal tax rate is even higher than 25%, our estimates understate the true increase in the cost of borrowing to states. If one wanted to consider only the cost realized by the state government and excluding any federal subsidy, the tax adjustment could be set to zero.
The change in the tax-adjusted yield spread over this period was an increase of 0.86 percentage points at the mean and 1.05 at the median. This was completely due to the bonds that were not prerefunded (84% of our sample), as the pre-refunded bonds on average showed negligible changes in their spread to Treasuries. States lost substantial amounts in their investment funds during the last quarter of 2008. In dollar terms, the average loss was $8 billion during these three months. This is an average of 2.5% of GSP, 21% of total revenue, and 39% of the total value of the state's outstanding balance-sheet debt.
One cross-sectional standard deviation of the loss amounted to $12 billion, or 1% of GSP, or 9% of state revenue.
Calculating Yields and Borrowing Costs
To determine the effects on borrowing costs, we must calculate yields that take the option features (callability) of the bonds into account. This section explains these calculations.
Most municipal bonds (more than 61 percent of our sample) are callable. Owning a callable bond is like owning a non-callable bond and being short a call on the bond, so callable bonds are cheaper than non-callable bonds, ceteris paribus, and consequently pay higher yields. These higher yields do not reflect higher fixed-rate borrowing costs, but are the cost of the states' refinancing option.
States' true fixed-rate borrowing costs are consequently more accurately reflected by option-adjusted bond yields, i.e., yields on "synthetic" non-callable bonds, constructed by adding the calls back to the callable bonds.
Roughly 30 percent of the callable bonds in our sample have been pre-refunded. These bonds are typically secured by an escrow account holding a replicating portfolio of U.S. Treasury securities, which will pay off the bond on the first call date. Consequently, while technically callable these bonds are effectively non-callable, maturing on their pre-refund dates with face values equal to their call prices (which for roughly 30 percent of the pre-refunded bonds exceeds their face values).
For the non-prerefunded callable bonds (roughly 44 percent of our total sample), calculating an option-adjusted yield requires that we calculate an option-free bond price. That is, the price of the "synthetic" non-callable bond is constructed by adding the call back to the callable bond. The call embedded in a callable bond can be valued as a receiver swaption. A swaption is an option to take a position in an interest-rate swap agreement at some date in the future, where the swap's fixed rate is specified in the swaption contract. The state can force bond holders to deliver their fixed coupon bonds in exchange for a lump-sum payment, usually par. Because a bond newly issued at the swap rate trades at par, this is equivalent to forcing the bond holders to exchange a stream of fixed payments (the bond's coupons) for a different, currently unknown, stream of fixed payments (the future swap rate). Options of this sort are typically valued using Black's model for options on futures (see Appendix for details). The implicit assumption is that the future swap rate is log-normally distributed around its current level.
Bloomberg provides swaption prices, quoted in Black volatilities (i.e., the implied volatility of the future swap rate), for expiration dates out to ten years written on swaps with up to ten years maturity at option expiration. The implied volatility surface interpolated from this matrix can be used, with Black's model, to calculate the value of a swaption with any time to expiration and tenor.
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For each callable bond, we calculate its option-free price by summing 1) the bond's price obtained from Bloomberg, and 2) the price of the receiver swaption struck at the bond's coupon rate, expiring on the bond's first call date, with a tenor equal to the call's remaining maturity at expiry. We then add back accrued interest, which is not included in the quoted prices. Under market conventions, 11 Our prices are for swaptions written on US dollar LIBOR, and we consequently have the volatility surface for LIBOR swap rates. We employ it here as the best available proxy for the volatility surface for muni swap rates.
quoted prices do not include any interest that has accrued since the last coupon date, which the bond purchaser is required to buy at the time of purchase.
A bond's option-free yield is then calculated as the single discount rate that when used to discount all the bond's payments yields the bond's price (option-adjusted and including accrued interest). The yield spread is the difference between the bond's yield and the yield on a treasury security with the same duration.
Duration and Convexity
The price of an option-free bond (i.e., a non-callable bond, or an option-adjusted callable bond)
is given by
where t i are the times until coupons are paid, T is the time until principle is repaid, y is the bond's yield (annualized with semi-annual compounding), c is the coupon rate, and F is the face value (or for prerefunded bonds, price at which issue is pre-refunded). The duration of an option-free bond is the valueweighted average time at which the bond coupons and principle are paid,
The convexity is the value-weighted squared average time of the bond's payments:
Note that these are simply the duration and convexity of a non-callable bond and are appropriate for use with the option-adjusted yield spreads, which are calculated using the synthetic option-free bonds.
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Excess Returns
The municipal bond returns we employ are simply the change in the quoted prices of the tradable bonds. These prices are not adjusted for call features, and are "clean," in that they do not 12 The duration of a callable bond is the value-weighted average duration of the underlying option-free bond and the embedded call, , where w = P call / P callable bond . A completely analogous relation holds for convexity. For each callable bond the duration and convexity of the call can be calculated numerically, using Black's formula, assuming a parallel shift of the yield curve. As shown in Table 1 , the mean duration of the bonds in our sample, treating them as option-free, was 5.8 years. The mean duration of the tradable bonds, some of which are callable, is shorter at 5.2 years, as the investors receive their cash earlier whenever a state exercises its call option. include interest accrued from the previous coupon date. Municipal bonds' excess returns are calculated by subtracting from each bond's return the return to a duration-matched Treasury security (i.e., a Treasury with the same duration as the traded municipal bond). Duffie and Singleton (1999) show that, under the appropriate technical conditions, the market value of a defaultable claim to a dollar that will be paid T in the future, is given by exp where E Q denotes the risk-neutral expectation, r t is the short term interest rate process, and h t , L t and l t are the t ahead hazard rate for default, expected fractional loss given default and liquidity carrying cost, respectively. That is, a defaultable claim should be discounted using a cumulative adjusted short-rate, where this adjusted short-rate accounts for both the time-value of money, r t , and the "short-spread," s t = h t L t + l t , which reflects the total risk and liquidity adjusted mean-loss rate.
The Term Structure of Defaultable Bonds
Changes in yield spreads therefore reflect changes in the average expected short-spread over a bond's life, and thus reflect changes in the expected default rate, the expected recovery rates given default, and the expected carrying cost of illiquidity. For example, assuming a fixed recovery rate given default of 50 percent and a fixed one percent annual cost of illiquidity, an increase in a bond's yield spread over treasuries of one percent implies an increase in the risk-neutral hazard rate of default of two percent per year.
Discussion of Results
This section discusses the main results. First, we examine bivariate correlations that are suggestive of a link between pension fund investment returns and changes in municipal bond spreads.
We then move to multivariate regression analysis to add controls and consider interaction effects. address the concern that California may be an influential outlier.
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Equity and real estate are the categories that ex post lost substantially more in value than the fixed income categories. Across states, the mean of this variable is 67% and the standard deviation 7.5%. Other things equal, we should have seen states with more investable assets to lose perform worse during this period. We find that this is roughly the case. Although the relationship is 13 We also address this in Section 4 by highlighting the fact that the regression results are strongly significant within both the A to AA-ratings category (which includes California) and the AA category (which does not include California but which includes almost half of the states in the sample). Consistent with our hypotheses, the magnitude of the effect in the regressions is largest in the A to AA-category (20 basis points), strong in the AA category (10 basis points), and absent in the remaining category (AA+ and above).
weak, it is clearly upward sloping. This is the opposite of what one would expect if our result were simply picking up variation in rich states versus poor states, and is consistent with the idea that states that lost more in their investment funds were punished more by municipal bond markets.
The graphs in the lower right put the effects together and show the relation between the value lost in the pension fund as a share of state government revenue and the change in the yield spreads on the state municipal bonds. Taken literally, these graphs imply (in unweighted regressions) that for each additional 10% of state revenue lost in pension funds, muni returns were 88 (=8.82*10) basis points lower and spreads increased by 12 (=1.22*10) basis points more.
These graphs are suggestive that borrowing costs did rise for states that experience poor investment returns in their pension funds. However, the graphs analyze only average returns and spread changes, without controls for other characteristics of the bonds and states that sponsor them. In particular, they do not control for the maturity or duration of the bonds, which may differ across states.
Longer duration bonds are more sensitive to changes in interest rates. The figures also do not account for whether the bonds are callable. They analyze investor returns, which are the most easily measured, and not the actual borrowing costs implicit in the prices. The graphs in Figures 2 and 3 also do not control for state level differences such as credit quality, level of debt, level of pension liabilities, and sensitivity of revenues to GDP. These will be important controls in our regression analysis. Using non pre-refunded bonds only (13,160 out of 15,727), Table 3 shows the effect of the value losses on tax-adjusted yield spreads, which we calculate using the methodology explained in Section 3.
As explained in Section 2, the tax adjustment is 25%. Based on the left column, in which all bonds are treated equally, the effects are only marginally significant. In the middle column, in which we consider only bonds with greater than $10M in offer size, the effect of a The pre-refunded bonds excluded from Table 3 (approximately 16% of the sample) provide useful within-state control samples to identify the effect of the investment losses on bonds of different values. Given the security offered by pre-refunded bonds, these should not be affected by default considerations (Chalmers (1998)). In Table 4 we therefore use the full sample of 15,727 bonds to estimate an effect on non-prerefunded bonds in states rated AA or below. Of the 39 states in the sample, 22 are AA or below, accounting for 63% of the bonds, and we would not expect an effect of investment losses on yields in the more highly rated states. In all specifications, the triple interaction shows a strong and highly statistically significant effect of investment losses on this group of bonds. For each percentage point of GSP lost, spreads increased on non-prerefunded bonds in AA-or-below states by 18-27 basis points. For each 10 percentage points of revenue lost, spreads increased on nonprerefunded bonds in AA-or-below states by 18-33 basis points. The result is statistically significant at the 1% level in all specifications in Table 4 . Table 5 further expands the analysis by examining interactions with finer ratings categories and also including controls in columns (2) and (4) Among states that are rated AA, the effects are one-third to one-half as large, around 8-13 basis points.
Among states rated AA+ or AAA (the omitted interaction), the effect is not present. This evidence is consistent with the idea that markets punished states with greater investment losses through higher yields due to concerns about possible defaults.
The fact that the results are robust to credit rating interactions shows that even within these categories, states that had greater losses experienced relatively larger yield spread increases on their traded, non-refunded bonds. The effect is therefore not simply due to a correlation of large investment losses with poor credit ratings, or due to one or two outlying states in the worst rating category. Figure 4 illustrates the results of Table 5 increases, this difference between the behavior of pre-refunded versus not pre-refunded bonds grows larger for AA rated states than for states in the highest rating category. As a result, the difference in the AA category versus the highest rating category is much stronger in the triple interaction term than is implied by the bars in Figure 4 .
Regarding the other controls in In Table 6 we limit the sample to only those 8,089 bonds that are not pre-refunded and rated AA or below, in order to examine whether bonds covered by a monoline insurer were less affected by the investment losses. We might have expected the insurance to provide some protection, but at the same time, the value of the insurance during this period declined substantially. The table illustrates several notable findings. In two of the three specifications (the full-sample unweighted on the left and the full-sample weighted on the right) the existence of insurance does not have a statistically significant protective effect on the increase in yield spreads -though it should be noted that the insured bonds of course had lower yield spreads to begin with. In the regressions on the sample of issues greater than $10 million, the effect of the investment losses on the change in the yield spread is about half as large for insured bonds as it is for uninsured bonds. For example, each percentage point of GSP lost is correlated with a 14.15 basis point increase in the tax adjusted spread if the bond is insured, but a 28.07 (= 14.15+13.92) basis point increase if the bond is uninsured.
In untabulated results, we examine whether the yield spread effect is higher for each year of bond duration. At best we find weak evidence of this. For example, if we expand the regression in column (1) of the largest bonds, the spread effect is larger for longer duration bonds, but this effect is driven by the very largest bonds. Similarly, if we replace the insurance interactions in Table 6 (non pre-refunded bonds rated AA or below only) with duration interactions, the coefficient on [dFunds / GSP]*[Duration] is small and has a t-statistic of 0.6, while the coefficient on [dFunds / GSP] is 12.56 with a t-statistic of 2.90. In this setting as well, if we weight by size, there is some evidence that among the largest bonds, the spread effect is larger for longer duration bonds, but again, this effect is driven by the very largest bonds. We conclude that the effect is approximately constant over the yield curve, suggesting a constant upward shift in annual risk-neutral default probabilities (or downward shift in recovery rates) implied by market yields.
Conclusions
This paper uses variation across states in investment losses during the last quarter of 2008 to measure the effects of increases in unfunded liabilities on municipal bond yields at the state level. Our results imply that U.S. state municipal bond yields will likely increase if unfunded state liabilities continue to grow, making new state debt more expensive to finance.
It is instructive to compare the states' fiscal position to that of the U.S. federal government.
Across all 50 states, total on-balance-sheet state government debt amounts to approximately $0.94 trillion, while unfunded pension liabilities are $3.2 trillion when measured at Treasury rates. Given total state revenue of around $750 trillion, the ratio of unfunded liabilities to revenue for the 50 states combined is about 2.8, excluding public medical programs. This fiscal position appears stronger than that of the U.S. government, which collects about $2.5 trillion in annual revenue, compared to $9 trillion in debt, an approximately $10.5 trillion gap in Social Security (Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2009)) , and an unfunded liability for civil service employees of around $0.6 trillion (Office of Personnel Management (2005)). In total, the U.S. government's unfunded liabilities excluding public medical programs are therefore around 8 times its annual revenue.
The behavior of municipal yield spreads therefore highlights the fact that fundamental differences between state governments and the U.S. federal government -or differences between the markets for their debt -generate important differences in borrowing rates. The U.S. dollar plays a unique role as a reserve currency at the world's central banks, and U.S. Treasury debt enjoys superior trading liquidity as well as a perception by market participants that it is risk-free (Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2008)). The nature of the default events and likely extent of recovery are also very different, with the federal government retaining the capacity to erode the value of its debt through inflation. Understanding the effects of state and federal fiscal decisions on bond markets is an important avenue for future research.
Appendix: The Black Value of a Swaption
This appendix shows the computation of the Black value of a swaption, expiring in t and written on a swap with tenor T making semi-annual payments at the rate c. Define F as the future swap rate, adjusted for the call's strike: The figure shows the effects of state investment losses on yield spreads during the period September-December 2008 for non pre-refunded bonds of differing credit quality. The numbers shown are from the triple-difference regression shown in columns (2) and (4) of The top panel shows asset allocation for 71 investment funds across 116 pension plans for 50 states as reported by Pensions and Investments, as of September 2008. As a proxy for the returns to domestic stock, international stock and real estate we use the returns to Barra/MSCI Investible Indices (USA, World ex-USA and US REIT, respectively). For domestic fixed income, international fixed income, mortgages and the "other" category we use Barclays Capital Indices (US Government/Credit, Global Aggregate Ex USA, US MBS and Asset-Weighted Hedge Fund, respectively). The returns to cash and equivalents are from Ken French's website (one month risk-free rate). For the return to private equity we use the mid-point of the range estimated by Steven N. Kaplan (private conversation). 
